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Mullā Ṣadrā on the Efficacy of Prayer (du‘ā)1
Sayeh Meisami
University of Dayton, Ohio

Abstract
This paper presents the manner in which Mullā Ṣadrā explains the influence of prayer
(du‘ā) on the world, drawing as he does on Ibn ‘Arabī’s ideas against the backdrop of his
own dynamic metaphysical psychology. Mullā Ṣadrā’s eventually distances himself from
Ibn Sīnā’s position on the passive nature of prayer, and instead opts for Ibn ‘Arabī’s
reading of the intimate divine-human interplay in prayer itself. In doing so, Mullā Ṣadrā
provides a formulation of prayer in which the supplicant plays a more active role in
eliciting the divine response to her prayer. For Mullā Ṣadrā, prayer therefore fashions the
human soul, while the human soul also fashions the outcome of prayer.
Keywords
Cosmology, cosmic change, divine providence, existential gradation, heavenly souls,
imagination, imaginal power, perfect human, prayer, substantial motion.

Introduction
The impact of prayer on the cosmos through the mediation of human agency, for example
in praying for rainfall, particularly in the face of the law of causality has often attracted

I would like to thank Professor Todd Lawson at University of Toronto for his insightful
comments on the first draft of this paper and also the anonymous reviewers for their
helpful notes and suggestions.
1
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the attention of major Islamic philosophers.2 They have not only contributed to
developing a theoretical framework for explaining the influence of human prayers on the
cosmos, but also have responded to possible objections to this influence from both
theological (kalām) and philosophical (falsafa) quarters. Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibrāhīm
Shīrāzī (d. 1050/1640), widely known as Mullā Ṣadrā, has a unique position on prayer
owing to his synthetic and holistic approach toward core issues about the God-world
relationship. Mullā Ṣadrā was heir to several intellectual and spiritual traditions of Islam
in general, particularly the school of Ibn ‘Arabī. Relying on this heritage, he created a

Early Western literature on Muslim prayer mainly focused on ritualistic prayer
(ṣalā) and was developed within a comparative context. Historical studies, particularly
those with a comparative edge, have often been carried out as an attempt to understand
Muslim faith and culture due to the fact that prayer reflects both the doctrinal and the
social, not to say popular, aspects of the religion. In this regard, the pioneering work of
Constance E. Padwick is important owing to her interpretation of Islamic prayer manuals
in order to show the continuity between Islam and Christianity. She has been praised for
her attempts to draw the attention of the scholars away from the apparent arid formality
of prayers towards their inner meaning and spirituality. See Constance. E. Padwick,
Muslim Devotions: A Study of Prayer-manuals in Common Use (London: S.P.C.K, 1961).
Henry Corbin addresses prayer as "a dialogue between two beings" and explains it in
terms of his thesis of creative imagination. See Henry Corbin, Creative Imagination in the
Sufism of Ibn ‘Arabī (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), 247. Following
Corbin, there have been several other works on prayer in Ibn ‘Arabī's thought. Prayer in
Ibn ‘Arabī has also been the subject of a special issue of The Journal of Muhyiddin Ibn
‘Arabī Society. See Stephen Hirtenstein, ed., Prayer & Contemplation: Foundations of the
Spiritual Life according to Ibn ‘Arabī (Oxford, UK: Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabī Society, 1993).
The mystical aspect of prayer in Islam has also been discussed by Annemarie Schimmel.
She looks into some major Sufi works including poetry and prose in order to picture the
meaning and function of prayer in spiritual Islam. See Annemarie Schimmel, "Some
Aspects of Mystical Prayer in Islam," Die Welt des Islams 2 (1952). Recently Katz has tried
to capture a wider scope of prayer in Islam by investigating prayer in relation to broader
issues such as ethical transformation and social communication. See Marion Holmes
Katz, Prayer in Islamic Thought and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013). For a noteworthy work on the nature and function of prayer in the context of
Qur’anic and Sufi literature, see Atif Khalil, “Is God Obliged to Answer Prayers of Petition
(Du‘ā)? The Response of Classical Sufis and Qur’anic Exegetes,” The Journal of Medieval
Religious Cultures 37:92 (2011).
2
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complex system in which philosophical, theological, Sufi, and Shi‘i discourses mingle in
order to present a new narrative of creation that can accommodate both the absolute
power of the creator and the relative, yet influential, force of human agency. In this
regard, an investigation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion of prayer (du‘ā) can be quite
illuminating as he relies on his synthetic methodology to prove the influential role of
human agency in the face of the doctrine of divine providence (qaḍā ̓ al-ilāhī) and the
logic of causal necessity.
This paper will focus on several major works by Mullā Ṣadrā in which he discusses
prayer as a venue of change in the cosmos. After briefly explaining Mullā Ṣadrā’s position
on prayer in relation to his Sufi-oriented Shi‘ism and against the background of Islamic
philosophy, attention will be paid to Ibn ‘Arabī because of his deep influence on Mullā
Ṣadrā’s philosophical system in general, and his view of prayer in particular. As we shall
see, Mullā Ṣadrā’s position on prayer can be best understood in the light of Ibn ‘Arabī’s
influence. In his account of the efficacy of prayer, Mullā Ṣadrā also relies heavily on the
conceptual framework provided by Ibn Sīnā. Nevertheless, he seems to finally break from
the Peripatetic framework in order to offer a more organic view of prayer in relation to
the human soul and the cosmos.
The Sufi-Shi‘i Background of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Thought
Before discussing Mullā Ṣadrā’s definition of prayer and his attempts to explain its nature
and efficacy, it is important to delineate the relation of this topic to his Sufi-oriented
Shi‘ism. It is against this syncretic background that one can appreciate the significant place
of prayer in Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought. Apart from the fact that he was a practicing Twelver
Shi‘i living under the Shi‘i rule of the Safavids (880-1101 /1501-1722), Mullā Ṣadrā was
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also heir to the Shi‘i tendency toward the esoteric aspects of faith that had gained force
through Sufi influence.
It has been correctly argued that Sufism and Shi‘ism were inspired by "the same
sources" very early in their history and share many common characteristics.3 This fruitful
alliance that had a gradual formation showing up in a significant commentary on ‘Alī b.
Abī Ṭālib’s Nahj al-balāghah by Maytham Baḥrānī (d. 699/1299)4 and culminating in a
more systematic way in the works of Sayyid Ḥaydar Ᾱmulī (d. ca. 787/1385), was a
significant influence on Mullā Ṣadrā. In this respect, a theme which is immediately
pertinent to the present discussion of prayer is the Sufi-Shi’i doctrine of wilāya,5 most

Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Shi‘ism and Sufism: Their Relationship in Essence and
History," Religious Studies, 6, no. 3 (1970): 242. Also, see Kāmil Muṣṭafā al-Shaybī, alṢilaḥ bayna al-taṣawwuf wa-al-tashayyu‘ (Cairo: Dār al-Ma ‘ārif, 1969). On the esoteric
aspects of imamate also see Henry Corbin, En Islam Iranien, aspects spirituels et
philosophiques, 4 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 3:149-355; Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi,
The Divine Guide in Early Shiʻism : the Sources of Esotericism in Islam (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1994); Amir-Moezzi and Christian Jambet, Qu’est-ce que le
Shi ̒isme? (Paris: Fayard, 2004).
3

Maytham b. ʻAlī Baḥrānī, Sharḥ nahj al-balāghah, eds. Team of scholars, 5 vols.
(Tehran: Mu‘assisat al-Naṣr, 1959). His book on theology is imbued with philsophical
themes and terminology. See also Maytham b. ʻAlī Baḥrānī, Qawā‘id al-marām fi ‘ilm alkalām, ed. Sayyid Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī (Qum: Kitābkhānah-i ‘umūmī-i Āyat Allāh al-‘Uẓmā
Mar‘ashī Najafī, 1398 A.H.). Also, see Majīd Rūḥī Dihkurdī, "Mu‘arrifī wa rawish-shināsī-i
Sharḥ nahj al-balāghah by Maytham Baḥrānī," ‘Ulūm-i ḥadīth 48 (1378 sh. ): 56-77. For
the influence of Maytham Baḥrānī on Shi‘i imamology, see Hamid Mavani, "Doctrine of
Imamate in Twelver Shi‘ism: Traditional, Theological, Philosophical and Mystical
Perspectives” (PhD diss., McGill University, 2005).
4

The term wilāya is also used interchangeably with walāya comprising a complex
semantic field referring to devotion, love, charisma, and authority which are
complementary in the Shi‘ite context. For a detailed discussion of this issue in the Shi‘ite
context, see Ḥaydar b. ʻAlī Āmulī, Jāmi‘ al-asrār va manba‘ al-anwār, ed. Henry Corbin and
Isma‘il Othmān Yaḥyā (Tehran: Anīstītū-i Īrān va Faransah, 1969); Mohammad Ali AmirMoezzi, “Notes on Imāmī Walāya,” in The Spirituality of Shi ̒i Islam : Beliefs and Practices,
ed. Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, 231-277 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Maria Massi
5
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prominently in Ibn ‘Arabī’s intricate formulation of it in terms of the doctrine of “the
perfect human” (al-insān al-kāmil). In his commentary on Nahj al-balāghah, Baḥrānī
draws on both philsophical and Sufi ideas. For him God has given His Friends (the awlīyā)
the ability" to receive His mercy (raḥma) and expand his grace (ni‘ma) that He has
bestowed on them so they can be in His exalted presence with ultimate felicity and
happiness (sa‘āda), and perform miracles."6 Mullā Ṣadrā is inspired by Ḥaydar Ᾱmulī’s
identification of the Sufi spiritual Pole (quṭb) with the Imam7 by introducing the “People
of the House” (ahl al-bayt) who were the genealogical descendants of the Prophet, as the
best embodiments of wilāya. The concluding paragraph of al-Shawāhid al-rububiyya that
deals with the continuation of prophethood in the form of wilāya is found to be an
adaptation of a passage from Ibn ‘Arabī’s The Meccan Revelations (al-Futūḥāt al-

makiyya). Mullā Ṣadrā introduces “the people of the House” within the quotation from
Ibn ‘Arabī.8 Furthermore, in line with Ibn ‘Arabī, he keeps the scope of wilāya wide
enough to go beyond the Twelve Imams:

Dakake, The Charismatic Community: Shi‘ite Identity in Early Islam (Albany: University
State of New York, 2007).

6

Baḥrānī, Sharḥ nahj al-balāghah, 2: 317.

Ḥaydar b. ʻAlī Āmulī, Jāmi‘ al-asrār va manba‘ al-anwār, ed. Henry Corbin and
Isma‘il Othmān Yaḥyā (Tehran: Anīstītū-i Īrān va Faransah, 1969), 223. For the influence of
Ibn ‘Arabī on Shi‘i theology through Ḥaydar Āmulī, see Robert Wisnovsky, "One Aspect of
the Akbarian Turn in Shi‘i Theology," in Sufism and Theology, ed. Ayman Shihadeh
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007); Khanjar Ḥamīyah, al-ʻIrfān al-Shīʻī: dirāsah
fī al-ḥayāh al-rūḥīyah wa-al-fikrīyah li-Ḥaydar al-Āmulī (Bayrūt: Dār al-Hādī, 2004);
Herman Landolt, “Ḥaydar Āmulī et les deux mi‘rāj,” Studia Islamica 1:91 (2000): 91-106.
7

Shigeru Kamada, "Mullā Ṣadrā's Imāma/Wilāya: An Aspect of His Indebtedness to
Ibn ‘Arabī," Journal of Islamic Philosophy 6 (2010): 71. For an elaborate discussion of this
8
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Thus wilāya is a divine quality (na‘t) and so is a [divine] inheritance. And
walī will not receive this position from the prophet unless God would take it
from the prophet through inheritance to confer it on walī so that the
position would be in its fullest and most perfect form. However, some of the
awliyā receive this position from the prophet as a heritage such as the
People of the House (ahl- al-bayt)-peace be upon them- who saw the
Prophet in person... As for the rest of awliyā, they receive the position
directly from God because God Himself is the inheritor [of wilāya] and
bestows it on them.9
While having a pivotal place in Mullā Ṣadrā’s metaphysics in general, wilāya also has
a special place in his narrative of human agency through prayer. This theme will be
discussed further in the next section of the paper.
Prayer and the Creative Power of the Human Soul
a. Substantial Motion and Evolution
One of the hallmarks of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy is the doctrine of substantial motion (al-

ḥarakat al-jawhariyya), according to which the whole world in both substances and
accidents is a movement toward perfection.10 Although this doctrine has crucial
implications in both the physical and spiritual domains, it is only the substantial motion
of the soul that is directly related to the present discussion of prayer.

issue, see Maria Massi Dakake, "Hierarchies of Knowing in Mullā Ṣadrā's Commentary on
the Uṣūl al-kāfī," Journal of Islamic Philosophy 6 (2010): 5-44.
Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, ed. Seyyid
Jalāl al-Dīn Ᾱshtīyānī (Mashhad: Dānishgāh-i Mashhad, 1968), 377-78. The quotation is
translated in Sayeh Meisami, Mulla Sadra (London, UK: Oneworld, 2013), 112.
9

For substantial motion, see Mahdi Dehbashi,Transubstantial Motion and the
Natural World: With a Translation of Volume III, Stage 7, Chapters 18-32 of the Asfar of
Mulla Sadra. London, ICAS Press, 2010. For a comprehensive explnation of substantial
motion, see Eiyad S. al-Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology: Evolution of Being (London
10

and New York: Routledge, 2015), chapter 4.
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According to the thesis of substantial motion, "the individual human soul is an
evolving entity11 which is material in its early phases, being essentially connected to and
dependent on the body, but capable of crossing over the bodily borders" and soaring up
to immaterial heights.12 According to Mullā Ṣadrā, “the soul is bodily in its origination but
spiritual in its subsistence.”13 At first the soul is mere potentiality, and in its early phases
is even devoid of perceptual faculties. These phases are connected with and dependent on
the life of the body from embryonic evolution up through infancy and later phases in the
life of the individual. The soul goes through the phases of the vegetative, the animal, and
the rational. The human soul is also characterized by "an encompassing unity (waḥdat al-

jam’iyya) that is a shadow of divine unity (waḥdat al-ilāhiyya) in being by itself
intellective (‘āqila), imaginative (mutakhayyila), and sentient (ḥassāsa)."14 These
faculties of the soul correspond at the cosmic level to the hierarchical ranks of being, that

Mullā Ṣadrā scholars have frequently explained that this should not be confused
with Darwinian evolutionism. See Herman Landolt, "Being-toward-resurrection as a
Theme of Shi‘i Philosophy: Mullā Ṣadrā," unpublished manuscript, pdf file, 13. (courtesy of
Todd Lawson)
11

12

Meisami, Mulla Sadra, 73.

13

Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, 221.

Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, 228; al-Ḥikmat al-almuta‘āliya fi asfār al‘aqlīyat al-arba‘a, ed. Muḥammad Reḍa Muẓaffar, 9 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-iḥyā’ al-turāth al‘arabī, 1999), 3: 362. Mullā Ṣadrā is indebted to Ibn ‘Arabī for this encompassing unity. In
Faṣṣu ḥikmatin ilāhiyya fi kalimatin Ᾱdamiyya, Ibn ‘Arabī describes human being as the
togetherness (jam‘iyyat) of all the truths and the mirror of all divine Names. See Muḥyī alDīn Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, trans. Muhammad Ali Muvaḥḥid and Ṣamad Muvaḥḥid
(Tehran: Nashr-i kārnāmeh, 1385 sh.), 157. On the influence of Ibn ‘Arabī on Mullā Ṣadrā,
also see Mohammed Rustom, The Triumph of Mercy: Philosophy and Scripture in Mullā
Ṣadrā (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012).
14
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is, they respectively correspond to the intellective world, the imaginal world, and the
sensible world.
Mullā Ṣadrā agrees with Ibn ‘Arabī on the purpose of creation. They both believe
that God, as a hidden treasure, makes Himself known through the humankind15 due to the
comprehensiveness of the human soul that encompasses all the levels of existence,
meaning, the intellectual, the imaginal, and the material. Furthermore for Mullā Ṣadrā, the
human soul is a dynamic whole that "gains new forms and moves from one grade to the
other. That we find ourselves different to what we were in the past or what we shall be in
the future cannot be all due to accidental changes, but rather because of the change in the
very substance of our soul."16
Humankind is supposed to be capable of moving from the level of a material being to
higher spiritual levels and in doing so complete the circle of creation, that is, the descent
from the immaterial to the material and the ascent back to the immaterial:
Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī, "Sharḥ-i ḥadīth kuntu kanzan
makhfiyyan," in Majmū ̒a-yi rasa’il-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-muta’allihīn, ed. Ḥāmid Nājī Iṣfahānī
(Tehran: Ḥikmat, 1385 sh.), 356. On this subject, see Armin Eschraghi, “'I was a Hidden
Treasure'. Some Notes on a Commentary Ascribed to Mulla Sadra Shirazi: Sharḥ ḥadith:
'Kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan'” in Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages: Studies in Text,
Transmission and Translation, in Honour of Hans Daiber, ed. Anna Akasoy and Wim Raven,
91-100 (Leiden: Brill, 2008).
15

Meisami, Mulla Sadra, 74-75. In Kitāb al-‘arshiyya, Mullā Ṣadrā supports
substantial motion by alluding to several Qur ҆anic verses. See Kitāb al-ʻarshīyah, ed. Fātin
Muḥammad Khalīl al-Labūn, and Fuʼād Dakār (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-tārīkh al-ʻArabī,
2000), 25. See also Seyyid Jalāl al-Dīn Ᾱshtīyānī's explanatory notes on the meaning of
“perfect human” in Mullā Muḥammad Ja‘far Lāhījī, Sharḥ risālat al-mashā‘ir-i Mullā Ṣadrā,
ed. Seyyid Jalāl al-Dīn Ᾱshtīyānī (Qum: Būstān-i kītāb, 1386 sh.), 391-92. For Mullā Ṣadrā’s
thesis of motion in substance in comparison to classical philosophy, see Rahman, The
Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, 94-113. Also on connections between metaphysical
psychology and epistemology in Mullā Ṣadrā, see Ibrahim Kalin, Knowledge in Later
Islamic Philosophy: Mullā Ṣadrā on Existence, Intellect, and Intuition (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010).
16
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Human perception of every level of the world consists in unification
(ittiḥād) with [that level] and it is actualized by its being. Some of these
beings are sensible, some imaginal, and some intelligible. Thus, being was
first an intellect, then a soul, then sensation, then matter; but it turned
around and became a sensation, then a soul, then an intellect and rose up to
where it had fallen from, and God is the origin and the end. When the
human being reached this divine station, he was informed of the divine
providence (al-qaḍā’ al-ilāhī) and the Lord’s predetermination (al-qadar alrabbānī).17
The perfection of the human soul is essentially associated with the Sufi doctrine of
the perfect human (al-insān al-kāmil) which is also identified with "the Muḥammadan
Reality (al-ḥaqiqat al-Muḥammadiyya)."18 According to Mullā Ṣadrā," the perfect human
is the one over whom no other takes priority in being the goal (ghāya) of the creation."19
At this level, the soul is capable of creating images which possess imaginal reality like in

Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, 351. Mullā Ṣadrā supports his view on the fall
of the soul and its return by resorting to both his philosophical past masters, religious,
and spiritual texts. See Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-muta‘āliya, 8: 355-58. Also on this issue, see
Maria Massi Dakake, “The Soul as Barzakh: Substantial Motion and Mullā Ṣadrā’s Theory
of Human Becoming,” The Muslim World 94, no. 1 (2004): 107-130. The difference
between qaḍā’ and qadar is a complicated matter in philosophical theology. According to
Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s reading of Ibn Sīnā on this distinction, “qaḍā’ is the existence of all
things in the intelligible world (al-‘ālam al-‘aqlī) together in a general (mujmala) state by
way of transcendent innovation (ibdā‘). And qadar is the existence [of those things] in the
external matter after the fulfilment of particular conditions one after the other.” See Ibn
Sīnā, al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbihāt, ed. Sulayman Dunya (Cairo: Dār al-ma’ārif, 1960), 3-4: 729.
18 On this doctrine, see William Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn ‘Arabī’s
Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989). In
Sufi discourse, the station of the Pole of the Poles (quṭb al-aqṭāb) is represented by the
very inner reality of Prophet Muḥammad. See Kamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Razzāq Kāshānī,
Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣūfiyya, ed. Muḥammad Kamāl Ibrāhim Ja‘far (Qum: Maṭba‘at al-Amīr, 1370
sh.) 145. Mullā Ṣadrā has a long passage about the perfect human and his identification
with the Imam in his Sharḥ uṣūl al-kāfī, ed. Muḥammad Khājavī, 4 vols. (Tehran:
Pizhūhishgāh-i ʻulūm-i insānī va muṭālaʻāt-i farhangī, 2004/1383sh), 2: 487-88. For the
translation of the passage, see Herman Landolt, "Being-toward-resurrection as a Theme of
Shi‘i Philosophy," 26.
17

Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī, Maẓāhir al-ilāhīyyah fī asrār al-‘ulūm
al-kamāliya, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Qum: Būstān-i kitāb, 1387 sh.), 116.
19
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the case of Moses’ staff appearing as a serpent. Changes in the cosmic picture that come to
exist through the power of the soul in prayer are in certain cases dependent on the
intermediary (barzakhī) level of being, that is, the imaginal level.
b. The Power of Imagination
The attribution of marvels and miracles to the Friends of God (awlīyā) is a common
theme of Sufi literature. For example, there are many accounts about the power of awlīyā
over the world.20 Part of Ibn ‘Arabī’s contribution to systematizing Sufi beliefs is the
explanation for the perfect soul’s causing changes in the world. In al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya,
Ibn ‘Arabī regards imagination as "the vastest of Presences (ḥaḍarāt)" as it combines both
the unseen and the seen worlds. He attributes this level of being to the human soul:
And there is no doubt that you are more entitled (aḥaqq) to the Presence of
Imagination than are meanings and spiritual beings, for within you is the
imaginal faculty (al-quwwat al-mutakhayyila) which is one of the faculties
that God gave you when He brought you into existence. So you are more
entitled to possess (mulk) and control (taṣarruf)...The common people (al’āmma) do not know imagination or enter into it except when they dream
and their sensory faculties (al-quwā al-ḥassāsa) return into it. The elite (alkhawāṣṣ) see it in wakefulness through the power of realizing it.21
This quotation refers to a unique creative function that works through the venue of
autonomous of imagination. According to Henry Corbin, this is "Active Imagination" that

For examples of these accounts and sources on this topic, see John Renard,
Friends of God : Islamic Images of Piety, Commitment, and Servanthood (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2008), 106-12.
20

Ibn ‘Arabī, The Meccan Rrevelations, ed. Michel Chodkiewicz, trans. William
Chittick, Charles-André Gilis, and Michel Chodkiewicz, annot. James Morris, 2 vols. (New
York: Pir Press, 2004), 2:172-173. The translation of this passage is by William Chittick.
Also, see Ibn ‘Arabī, Le livre des chatons des sagesses, trans. and ed. Charles-André Gilis
(Beirut: Al-Burāq, 1997), 243-54; Chittick, Sufi Path of Knowledge, 122.
21
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is "capable of creating objects, of producing changes in the outside world."22 The imaginal
world fits well into Mullā Ṣadrā’s gradational (tashkīkī) view of being.23 In this light, the
imaginative forms as mental beings and their extra-mental counterparts exist for real like
two parallel worlds whose difference lies in the intensity of their being. The mental
sphere resembles the creation of God in that the soul is capable of creating mental beings
as God creates the world of substantial forms both material and immaterial.24
Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul is capable of creating mental beings in the
absence of matter. His evidence for this is what happens in dreams, and the miraculous
creation of images by the prophets. However, the question is whether every soul at any
phase of its evolution has the actual ability to create. The answer is negative. Although the
soul, in its proximity to the divine realm, is given the power to create, in the beginning

Henry Corbin, Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn ‘Arabī (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1969), 223. The imaginal world is also mentioned in Ibn
‘Arabī, "Inshā’ al-dawā’ir" in Kleinere Schriften des Ibn al-‘Arabī: nach Handschriften in
Upsala und Berlin, ed. Henrik Samuel Nyberg (Leiden: Brill, 1919).
22

According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the concept of being applies to its instances univocally
because of the unity of its reality, and conceptual differences are only due to essences. On
the other hand, essences have no reality of their own. Based on these two premises, one
could come into the counterintuitive conclusion that diversity is not real. Gradation (or
modulation) of being (tashkīk al-wujūd) is Mullā Ṣadrā's way of avoiding this
counterintuitive implication and to create a system in which the apparently monistic
worldview of Sufism is reconciled with the realistic pluralism of classical philosophy and
our common sense. According to this doctrine, being, as one simple reality, comes in
grades as the light of Sun and candlelight are the same reality of different grades. See
Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-almuta‘āliya, 9:186. For a technical explanation of the doctrine and
its implications in other areas of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, see Sajjad H. Rizvi, Mullā Ṣadrā
and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being (New York: Routledge, 2009); Cécile Bonmariage,
Le réel et les réalités: Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī et la structure de la réalité (Paris: J. Vrin, 2007).
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this is only a potentiality. Apart from some unique cases of spiritually evolved souls, the
souls of common humans are dependent on matter as long as they live in this world.
According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the stages of knowledge formation, that is, sense
perception, imagination, and intellection are parallel with “the three worlds,”25 that is, the
intellective, the imaginal and the sensible. Thus, what happens in the soul matches the
hierarchical ontology of the three worlds which stand in a vertical (ṭūlī) relationship, that
is, the one on top is superior to the one below it in the grade of existence.
Through the power of imagination, all human souls are capable of creating bodies
for themselves in afterlife.26 However, in this world only the perfect souls of prophets,
Imams, and awlīyā are invested with the power to objectify imaginative forms. These are
25

Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-almuta‘āliya, 3:362.

Imaginal bodies are immaterial; yet they are possessed of the formal dimensions
of the physical body which makes them capable of all kinds of feelings compared to our
experiences in dreams. As long as we are bound up with matter, our imaginations are
merely subjective. But, if the soul can free itself from physical preoccupations and reach a
higher level of spirituality, it can give objective dimensions to imaginations. At this level,
imaginative forms are not imprinted in the brain so they are categorzied as “detached
imagination” (al-khayāl al-munfaṣil). This is the point of departure between Mullā Ṣadrā
and Ibn Sīnā who rejects the possibility of ontological independence of imaginal forms
from the brain. Mullā Ṣadrā follows Suhrawardī and Ibn ‘Arabī in this regard and posits an
intermediary world between the intellectual and the material world, which is the locus of
detached imaginal forms. According to Ibn ‘Arabī “the difference between attached and
detached imagination is that the attached disappears with the disappearance of the
imaginer, while the dettached is an essential presence (ḥaḍara dhātiyya).” See Ibn ‘Arabī,
al-Futūḥāt al-makiyya, Beirut, Dār Ṣadir, n.d, 2:312, cited in al-Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and
Eschatology, 97. He believes that the prophets and awlīyā have access to the imaginal
world and as a result are capable of objective imagination, as in the case of miracles; Yet
all will have this power in the life to come. So in his eschatology, in order to make this
notion more comprehensible, Mullā Ṣadrā compares the otherworldly bodies to
“reflections in the mirror.” For the mirror analogy, see Shīrāzī, Maẓāhir al-ilāhiyyah, 126.
On the imaginal body, see Christian Jambet, L’actre d’être: La philosophie de la révélation
chez Mollâ Sadrâ (Paris: Fayard, 2002), 296-327; Mohammed Rustom, “Psychology,
Eschatology, and Imagination In Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī’s Commentary on the Ḥadīth of
Awakening,” Islam and Science 5:1 (2007).
26
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"the possessors of marvels (aṣḥāb al-karāmāt)"27 as they reach the highest degree
through substantial motion. This theme is expressed with an emphatically spiritual tone
in Wāridāt al-qalbiyya with regard to prophetic miracles. Mullā Ṣadrā says:
The quintessence of the soul is of the same kind and origin of the
spiritual world (malakūt) whose inhabitants are by nature influential on
beings possessed of directions and sides (jihāt and samūt) [i.e. material
substances]. This is owing to the fact that the matter and natural
dispositions are under the control of the world of transcendent
innovation (al-‘ālam al-ibdā‘), be it out of compulsion or submission.
Thus, the soul that is a flame of that fire acts in the same fashion in
accordance with her capacity. Just like the flame that does the job of the
fire including burning and causing other effects in accordance with its
capacity. And, the first effect that appears from the essence of the soul is
the body and the base of its forces and organs, with every individual soul
being conscious of this mode of hers. If this seems right at first glance, so
the realization of a great soul (nafsu kabīra) should be sufficient for
administrating her territory upon a wider and longer scope in a way that
the command of her control and administration over the subdued
material bodies would encompass all and reach the whole world of
origination and corruption (al-‘ālam al-kawn wa al-fasād). It was in this
way that with the permission of God the fire around Abraham turned into
air as He said "O fire, be cool and safe for Abraham [(Q 21:69)]."28
c. Influencing the Material world
The power of the imagination is a good ground for the possibility of miracles in the
sense of bringing into life a previously non-existent form of being, or imaginal bodies in
afterlife; yet it is not enough for explaining the changes that some miracles and prayers
cause in the sensible reality, such as causing rainfall or splitting the Red Sea. For this
reason, Mullā Ṣadrā also identifies a particular power of the soul that he calls "practical
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Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, 264.

Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī, al-Wāridāt al-qalbiyya wa ma‘rifat alrubūbiyya, ed. Ahmad Shafī‘īhā (Tehran: Anjuman-i falsafa-yi Īrān, 1980), 113-14.
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(‘amalī)" and relates it to "the sensory faculties (quwā al-taḥrīkiyya)." Through this
power,
[The soul] influences the matter of the world by abstracting the form (ṣūra)
and stripping it of matter, and by finding it and dressing it in any way. This
is how [the soul] can cause the weather to become fine, and the rain to fall
and the storms to break out, and demolish a community that turned
immoral and disobeyed the command of their Lord and His messengers, and
cause sick people to be cured, and the thirsty to be satiated, and the beasts
to subdue.29
This passage and similar ones in Mullā Ṣadrā’s writings on the agency of the human soul
in prayer are all followed by his insistence on the similarity between the heavenly and the
human souls in influencing the material world:
And this is possible since it has been proved in theology that the matter
submits to the souls and is influenced by them, and that the natural forms
(al-ṣuwar al-kawniyya) succeed one another in the matter under the
influence of the heavenly souls. And, the human souls are of the same
substance as the heavenly souls, strongly resembling them, because their
relation to them is like that of children to their parents. Thus, the human
soul affects matter in this world although it is often through the effusion of
its effect over a certain domain, that is, her body.30
In a similar passage from al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, Mullā Ṣadrā limits the strong
resemblance between the human souls and heavenly souls to those human souls that
have "gained strength,"31 which in his philosophy refers to substantial motion by which
the soul is promoted to a higher degree of being. Thus, souls with a high degree of
existential intensity are invested with the power both to create and to influence matter.
According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the perfect human or "perfect walī" is able to "cross over all
Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī, al-Mabdaʼ wa’l-maʻād, ed. Sayyid Jalāl
al-Dīn Āshtīyānī (Tehran: Anjuman-i shāhanshāhī-i falsafah-i Īrān, 1976/1354), 482.
29
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Shīrāzī, al-Mabdaʼ wa’l-maʻād, 482.
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Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, 343.
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times and spaces and bring all things under control in the same way that the souls control
bodies."32 This is the domain where prayer is used as a link between the human and the
divine in order to cause certain effects in the world:
And at times the soul may reach such a degree of sagacity and purification
from bodily concerns and sensual pleasures that there shall be bestowed on
her from the Supreme Origin (al-mabda’ al-a‘lā) such a power and dignity
by which the soul becomes influential on the world of natural elements ( al‘ālam al-‘anāṣir). As a result, the soul would heal the sick, sicken the evil,
transform one element into another, and move those objects that she is not
typically capable of moving like in unhinging the door of Khaybar [by ‘Alī b.
Abī Ṭālib]. This is due to the fact that bodies are subject to influences by the
souls.33
However, any new appearance (badā’)34 or change along these lines would seem not
only to defy the necessity of universal causal laws, but also to rival the doctrine of divine
providence. Like earlier Muslim philosophers, Mullā Ṣadrā considers possible objections
and his solution is similar to those of his philosophical predecessors. However, the
following sections will show that although Mullā Ṣadrā follows his philosophical past
masters by considering the efficacy of prayer as both one of the links in the chain of
causation and part of the divine providential plan, he shapes his solution within a different
philosophical framework that is deeply influenced by Ibn ‘Arabī.
32

Shīrāzī, al-Wāridāt al-qalbiyya, 120.
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Shīrāzī, "Risalah fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar," 208.

The Shi‘i doctrine of badā refers to a new consideration by God and the possibility
of change in the divine plan. It is in opposition to Sunni theology and even among Shi‘ite
theologians, there are different ways to approach it. See Mahmoud Ayoub, "Divine
Preordination and Human Hope: a Study of the Concept of Badā ҆ in Īmāmī Shī‘ī
Tradition," Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 106, no. 4 (1986): 623-632;
Martin J. McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd (Beirut: Dar el-Mashriq
éditeurs, 1978), 329-339. Also, see Colin Turner, "Aspects of Devotional Life in Twelver
Shi‘ism," in Shi‘ism, ed. Paul Lutf and Colin Turner, vol. 3 (London: Routledge, 2008).
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Prayer within the Domain of Divine Providence
Mullā Ṣadrā was well aware of the theological context and controversial nature of prayer
with respect to divine providence. That is the reason why most of his passages on prayer
appear within his writings on divine providence and predetermination, with his main
focus being on the influence of prayer on the sensible world. Following Ibn Sīnā, he
attests to the efficacy of prayer and regards the agent of prayer and his invocation as "one
of the causes (asbāb wa ̒ilal) of the whole cosmos (kawn)."35 Ibn Sīnā offers a rational
explanation for the fulfilment of prayers within a causal order that is originated in the eternal
knowledge of God.36 According to him, the human soul is capable of exerting influence on the
world in the form of miracles and receiving answers to prayers. However, in the case of
prayers, "responses" (istijābat) are bestowed only if God finds it in agreement with the cosmic
order.37 Thus, prayers should not be considered as breaches in the causal order of the universe.
In effect, prayers are links within the causal chain in the sense that like all the other secondary
causes in the universe they play an intermediary role between the final effects and the First
Cause. Ibn Sīnā explains the necessary role of prayers by using the analogy of patient and
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For Ibn Sīnā's views on the origin of creation in the divine knowledge, see Ibn
Sīnā, The Metaphysics of the Healing : a Parallel English-Arabic Text (al-Ilāhiyyāt min alShifā), trans. and ed. Michael Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press,
2005), 283-291.
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medication. He says that "God is the one who makes prayer the cause for the existence of a
thing, just like He makes certain medicine the cause for the cure of a patient."38
In this regard, Mullā Ṣadrā also repeats a passage from Mīr Dāmād, without
mentioning the author, where the latter formulates the problem of prayer as a dilemma:
If the fulfilment of prayers is not determined by God, what is the point in praying to Him,
and if it is, why should we take the trouble of praying in the first place?39 Like his teacher,
Mullā Ṣadrā turns to Ibn Sīnā for the solution and quotes several passages from the latter
on the harmony between fulfillment of prayers and the divine order. Mullā Ṣadrā’s
position on divine providence and predetermination should be understood not only as a
continuation of Ibn Sīnā’s world-order in which all wills and agencies are connected in a
hierarchy of powers and potentialities, but also as more meaningful within his own
gradational ontology. In a short treatise on the theme of human action versus divine
providence, after reviewing and evaluating major theological positions, including
Mu‘tazilī and Ash‘arī- and the rational position of Ibn Sīnā which he praises as "the most
correct" among all - he goes on to his most favoured position that he attributes to "those
firmly grounded in knowledge (al-rāsikhūn fi’l- ̒ilm)."40 His account of this position is
completely based on his own gradational ontology:
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Ibn Sīnā, al-Taʻlīqāt, 47.

Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-almuta‘āliya, 6:403; Sharḥ uṣūl al-kāfī, 4:200-201. In these
works, Mullā Ṣadrā is quoting from Muḥammad Bāqir Mīr Dāmād, Kitāb al-qabasāt, ed.
Mehdi Mohaghegh and Charles Adams (Tehran: The Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill
University, 1977), 450.
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allegorical. But those in whose hearts is perversity follow the part thereof that is
allegorical, seeking discord, and searching for its hidden meanings, but no one knows its
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And the other group who are the most firmly grounded in knowledge
believe that all beings regardless of their differences in the order and
nobility of existence, and their diversity of essences and actions, and their
variety of attributes and effects, are gathered by the one all-encompassing
Divine Reality that includes all their realities and degrees...Therefore, just
like there is no mode [of glory] (sha’n) that is not His41, there is no action
that does not belong to Him...[Yet,] it is correct to attribute the action and its
actualization to the servant (‘abd) as existence and individuation
(tashakhkhuṣ) are attributed to him regarding their relation to the Exalted
One, just like the existence of Zayd is in itself a fact which is actualized in
reality while it is one of the modes (sha’n) of the First Reality (al-Ḥaqq alawwal).42
Mullā Ṣadrā also discusses the function and efficacy of prayer in his Risalah fi’l-qaḍā’

wa’l-qadar.43 After explaining the meaning of divine providence and predetermination, he
hidden meanings except Allah. And those who are firmly grounded in knowledge say:
"We believe in the Book; the whole of it is from our Lord:" and none will grasp the
Message except men of understanding.” (Q 3:7) Translation by Abdulla Yusuf Ali, The
Holy Qur ̓an (New York: Islamic Propogation Centre International, 1946)retreived from
http://www.searchtruth.com/chapter_display.php?chapter=3&translator=2&mac=
“Of Him seeks (its need) every creature in the heavens and on earth: every day in
(new) State of Glory.” Translated by Muhammad Habib Shakir retrieved from
http://www.searchtruth.com/chapter_display.php?chapter=55&translator=3&mac
=
41

Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Shīrāzī, Khalq al-aʻmāl, ed. Sayyid Muḥsin
Yāsīn (Baghdād: Maṭbaʻat al-ḥawādith, 1978), 30. In his summary of philosophical issues
based on Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, Fayḍ Kāshānī rephrases the above words by saying
that although God has given us freedom to choose whether or not to do a particular thing,
our wills all go back to His providence. See Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ al-Kāshānī, Uṣūl al-ma‘ārif,
ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Ᾱshtīyānī (Qum: Daftar-i tablīghāt-i islāmī, 2006/1375 sh.), 139.
For more on this issue see Jamīlah Muḥyī al-Dīn Bishtī, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī wamawqifuhu al-naqdī min al-madhāhib al-kalāmiyyah (Beirut: Dār al-‘ulūm al-‘Arabīyah litṭibāʻa wa’l-nashr, 2008), 238-46.
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proceeds to remove the ambiguity over the function of prayer in relation to providence.
He criticizes an "erroneous" view according to which acts of worship and prayers are
useless in a predetermined world order, and using Ibn Sīnā’s frequently quoted analogy
of patient and medicine, he immediately presents the gist of his description of prayer as
"one among the causes of the thing prayed for."44 Unlike in his writings mentioned before,
here Mullā Ṣadrā does not delimit his methodology to a rational explanation based on the
causal chain of creation; instead he explains the function of prayer within a context of
intimacy between the Lord and His Servant:
The prayer and the answer to it are both from the command (amr) of God,
with the servant’s tongue being the interpreter (tarjumān), and whoever
takes an action upon someone’s order his hand is the hand of the command
just like in the case of a king who orders some servant to punish the prince.
If the hand [of the servant] were not that of the king, he would not be able to
touch the king’s son.45
This view of prayer as "a translation" of God’s words in this treatise is a deviation
from Ibn Sīnā’s narrative of prayer that was the dominant one among philosophers of the
time such as Mīr Dāmād. This new account resembles Ibn ‘Arabī’s identification of human
prayer with the prayer of God and Corbin’s interpretation of it in terms of "a dialogical
situation."46 The similarity is reinforced by Mullā Ṣadrā’s many allusions in the following
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Rasā’il (Tehran: Lithographed edition, 1302 sh.), 206. Ibn Sīnā explains the necessary role
of prayers by using the analogy of patient and medication. He says that "God is the one
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passages to Sufi figures such as Dhu’l-nūn al-Miṣrī (d. 246/859) and Abū Bakr al-Shiblī (d.
334/946) who are said to have regarded prayer as a path to spiritual advancement.47 In
this section of the treatise, Mullā Ṣadrā emphasizes the effect of prayer on the human
soul. Rather than being a mere request or petition, prayer is a worthy act of worship that
leads to a higher degree of spirituality through accepting our dependence and need:
And from the benefits of prayer are the proclamation of humbleness (dhill)
and brokenness (inkisār), confession to weakness and poverty, the
correction of our relation of servanthood (‘ubūdiyya) and our immersion in
the excess of contingent deficiency (nuqṣān al-imkānī) and the fall from the
zenith of highness and sufficiency to the bottom of degradation and
needfullness and poverty and fearfulness.48
Along the same lines, Mullā Ṣadrā explains that prayer will divert the attention of
the soul from the body that "veils her from the Sacred World (al-’ālam al-quds)" toward
God who would then bestow on her all that befits her.49 Thus, speaking from a nobler
vantage point, the function of prayer is over and above making a request, and its
transforming effect on our soul is the reason why God urges us to pray as in "Call unto me
and I will answer to you" (Q 40:60). In this sense, prayer is not a deviation from the
providence; the act of praying is rather part of the divine wisdom to "keep the servant
suspended between fear and hope."50 At the cosmic level, prayer is a continuation of the
primordial function of human being as the medium of divine revelation in the world.
The Role of the Heavenly Souls of the Spheres (aflāk) in Human Prayers
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In Risalah fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar and, more elaborately, in al-Asfār Mullā Ṣadrā modifies
Ibn Sīnā’s account of the influence of the heavenly souls. Under the section that is called "on
prayer as coming itself from divine providence," Mullā Ṣadrā devotes several passages to
prayers that are answered. For him, prayers can "knock on the door of the spiritual world
(malakūt)51 and impress the ears of the inhabitants therein." 52 Before relating Ibn Sīnā’s
argument, Mullā Ṣadrā offers in a nutshell his view on the relation of heavenly souls to the
world below because there is a technical difference between his position on this issue and
that of Ibn Sīnā. While Ibn Sīnā explains the relation between the heavenly souls and the
world below as a one-way relation in which the former have only an active role, Mullā
Ṣadrā believes in a mutual relationship in which the heavenly souls are impressed by the
prayers, hence, the image of knocking their doors and being heard by them. He agrees with
Ibn Sīnā that a nobler being cannot be directly affected by the lower ones, but diverges
from him on the impressionability of the heavenly souls by adding two conditions. First, for
Mullā Ṣadrā, affecting the higher being is not impossible if it is not overall and in every
respect. Second, noble human souls have a more effective agency in comparison to ordinary
people. He attributes to the heavenly soul a state between substances that are purely active
(fa‘āl) or merely passive (munfa‘il).53 In Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy, the former state is that of
the intellects (al-‘uqūl), and the latter is attributed to the primary matter (hayūlā) and the

For the characteristics of this intermediary realm of being in the context of Islamic
philosophy, especially the influence of Ibn ‘Arabī and the scriptural connections of the
doctrine, see Corbin, En Islam iranien: Aspects spirituels et philosophiques, 4 vols. (Paris:
Gallimard, 1971), 4:106-22.
51

52

Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-muta‘ālīya, 6:402.

53

Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-muta‘ālīya, 6:402-3.

22

bodily form (al-ṣūrat al-jismiyya). The heavenly (or the Spheres’) souls (al-nufūs al-

falakiyya) can only be affected by the intellects and through them by the Necessary Being
(al-wājib al-wujūd).54 Yet, Mullā Ṣadrā considers the human soul as capable of affecting the
higher rank of the heavenly souls under the two conditions mentioned above. He does not
argue sufficiently for his position in this context, but we can try to understand him based
on his overall ontology: While in Ibn Sīnā’s ontology substances are separate, for Mullā
Ṣadrā "there is no complete separation in the longitudinal hierarchy of being."55
Accordingly, the heavenly souls possess an ontological status between purely active
intellectual beings and passive material beings. Furthermore, Mullā Ṣadrā’s psychology is
based on a spiritual metaphysics of descent and ascent. The human soul, though
temporarily trapped in the world below, is actually from above and through substantial
motion can rise above the present level of bodily attachment and enter into a state of
unification (ittiḥād) with higher beings. Considering the ontological continuity of beings
along the hierarchical/gradational ladder of existence and the possibility of ascent for the
human soul, there is room in Mullā Ṣadrā’s system for the impression of the human soul on
the heavenly souls through prayers.
With this in mind, we can now explain the role of the Spheres with regard to those
prayers that bring about changes in the physical world. In order to understand their role,
one need to explain both the form of knowledge that is possible in their case, as well as

On Ibn Sīnā's definition of substance and his general categorization of it, see Ibn
Sīnā, The Metaphysics of the Healing : a Parallel English-Arabic Text (al-Ilāhiyyāt min alShifā), trans. and ed. Michael Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press,
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their active place in the chain of wills that precede the occurrence of events in the natural
world. Mullā Ṣadrā explains heavenly knowledge and the mechanism of heavenly
influence on the world by quoting Ibn Sīnā.56 According to Ibn Sīnā, the heavenly souls
are said to have knowledge of particular meanings (ma‘ānī al-juz’iyya) through a kind of
perception which is not purely intellective. What is realized in them is an imaginative
perception of particular states and events in the world. This kind of perception shares
with the intellects the active/causal function but differs from them in that the intellects
only have "knowledge of particulars in a universal way,"57 to the exclusion of any
imaginative state and imaginative forms.
The heavenly souls are also said to exert influence on the world below through
imagination. First, Mullā Ṣadrā draws on Ibn Sīnā’s arguments in favour of the active role
of Spheres, that is, their heavenly souls. Accordingly, the occurrence of wills (irādāt)
behind actions and events is preceded by their non-existence, that is, they are temporally
originated (al-ḥādith al-zamānī), so they should have causes other than either wills or the
nature of the subject of the will (al-ṭabī‘at al-murīd). What existentiates a particular will
cannot be another will because this would lead to an infinite regress of wills, which is
logically impossible. On the other hand, the cause cannot be a natural disposition (ṭabī‘a)
in the willing agent because particular natures are existentiated by heavenly or earthly
causes. If the cause of that particular natural disposition is a complex of heavenly and
earthly causes, the philosophers’ point about the role of the Spheres is proved. But, if the
cause is only an earthly one, it would be temporally originated and last for a limited time,
56
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which means that the will at issue would be existent as long as the earthly nature is there.
To sum up, Mullā Ṣadrā agrees with Ibn Sīnā that "it is owing to the gathering,
interference and continuation of these [various] causes that the system [of the world]
runs under the influence of the heavenly motion."58
Thus, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, for Ibn Sīnā the sufficient cause (al-’illat al-tāmma)
of all the changes in the world consists in the hierarchical impact of causes beginning
with the Necessary Being (al-wājib al-wujūd) down to the intellects, the heavenly souls,
human souls, and natural dispositions. All changes in the world, as well as the order of
natural events depend on the intermediary role of the heavenly soul owing to the
existence of imaginative conceptions of events prior to their realization in the material
world:
[The heavenly souls] know in the majority of particulars that mode which
is the best and the fittest and the closest to the absolute good between two
possible states; and we proved that the [imaginative] conceptions
(taṣawwurāt) possessed by these causes are the origins of the existence of
these forms here when they are possible, and there has not been any
heavenly causes stronger than these [imaginative] conceptions. When
such is the case, it would be necessary for the possible state to become
existent not by an earthly cause or a natural cause in the heavens [alone]
but as a certain kind of impact by these things on the heavenly affairs. Yet,
this is not a real impact but the impact of the heavenly principles
(mabādī’) of the existence of this thing. So, by grasping those [universal]
principles, this thing is thought, and when this thing is thought, the state
which is more suitable for it will also be thought, and when it is thought,
there would be no obstacle but either the nonexistence of an earthly
natural cause or the existence of an[other] earthly natural cause. In the
case of the nonexistence of the earthly natural cause, for example, causing
heat where there is no earthly natural potential for heat, the heat would be
produced by the heavenly imagination of the benefit in it, just like heat can
be produced in people’s bodies as a result of imagining it, which you
learned before. As an example for the second possibility, that is, not only
the nonexistence of the cause for heating but also the existence of a cooling
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nature, the heavenly imagination of the benefit in the opposite of what is
necessitated by the cooling agent would overpower the latter.59
While confirming the general framework of Ibn Sīnā’s position on the causal relation
between the heavenly and the earthly, and praising his attempts to show that the divine
realm of providence is not affected by the things below, Mullā Ṣadrā criticizes him on two
grounds. He regards the changes in the natural world in response to prayers as evidence,
contrary to Ibn Sīnā’s account, that the heavenly souls of the spiritual realm (malakūt)
are impressed by the earthly domain.60 This point will be explained below. Second, he
criticises Ibn Sīnā for denying the existence of Platonic Ideas which he praises as the key
to "the mystery of interaction" between different domains of existence. 61 The existence of
Platonic Ideas is one of the major gaps between the philosophical systems of Ibn Sīnā and
Mullā Ṣadrā.62 Far from trying to argue for or against this doctrine, which is beyond the
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scope of the present paper, I would like to emphasize its significance for Mullā Ṣadrā’s
view of the efficacy of prayer since it implies real correspondence between things of
different existential domains along the vertical hierarchy of being, with the imaginative
forms bridging between the intellective and the material. As mentioned before, in Mullā
Ṣadrā’s world, there are no existential gaps, but merely different grades of beings.
It is based on the gradation of being that Mullā Ṣadrā argues for the unification of
intellect with the intelligible (ittiḥād al-’āqil wa’l-ma’qūl), imagination with the imaginal
(al-mutakhayyil wa ‘l-mutakhayyal), and sentient with the sensible (al-ḥāss wa’l-

maḥsūs). On the whole, the unification doctrine is built on several premises such as the
primacy of being as the only authentic reality, the gradation of being in different degrees
of intensity, the possibility of substantial motion of the soul, and the identification of
knowledge as a form of being. According to the unification doctrine, the subject of
knowledge and its object are two levels of the same reality. Knowledge is the
actualization of the potential knower by the immediate object of knowledge, be it
sensible, imaginative or intelligible forms that in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy are forms of
being.63
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With this in mind, the unification of imagination with the imaginal should be
considered as Mullā Ṣadrā’s key to accepting the confluence of human souls and heavenly
souls through prayer. In Risāla fi’l-qaḍā’ wa’l-qadar, he explains the influence of the
perfect human souls on the heavenly souls along the lines of al-Asfār by using the same
arguments and terminology. He also elaborates on the influence of the heavenly souls on
the human souls through imaginal unification. The heavenly souls are said to inspire the
purified human souls by guiding their prayers toward a direction beneficial to the world.
Thus "the relation of humility (taḍarru‘) to summoning (istid‘ā’) demands and the
fulfilment of requests is similar to the relation between thinking and the summoning of
expressions and speech. And all is emanation from above"64 that happens upon the
unification of the imagination of the praying soul and the imaginative conceptions of the
heavenly souls who play intermediary between the human and the divine. Mullā Ṣadrā’s
last passage on the efficacy of prayer is a useful summary of his position on its
compatibility with the providence and the role of the Spheres:
Thus, it is learned from what has been said that all the events that occur in
our world emit from the Spheres’ [imaginative] conceptions (al-taṣawwurāt
al-falakiyya), the angelic intellections (al-ta‘aqqulāt al-malakiyya) and the
knowledge(s) of the Exalted One (al-‘ulūm al-subḥāniyya). Therefore, the
truly influential agent on the existence of things is nothing but the Origins’
(mabādī’) knowledge of what is beneficial for the existent world. So, one
should not be surprised by the providential knowledge (‘ināyat) of the
Exalted One and His Grace concerning the betterment of the state of the
creation. Learn from this the truth of miraculous affairs that descend from
the First Reality (al-Ḥaqq al-awwal) in a special way which is denied by
those philosophers who are ignorant of the invisible means which control
natural dispositions (ṭabā’i‘).65
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Conclusion
Major Islamic philosophers seem to have all confirmed an active role for human
agency in causing changes in the world through praying. On the other hand, they have all
considered the efficacy of prayers in harmony with divine providence. Nevertheless,
Mullā Ṣadrā’s position on this metaphysical harmony, though appearing to be the same as
his predecessors, has a unique character due to its dependence on a different
cosmological framework within which causality takes a position between the pluralistic
realism of Ibn Sīnā and the existential monism of Ibn ‘Arabī.66 Mullā Ṣadrā’s follows an
organic approach in the light of the unity of all realities in being. The present paper has
focused on this approach in order to show that for Mullā Ṣadrā, prayer has a real
influence as a link between the macrocosm and microcosm due to the continuity between
different levels of being.
Classical Islamic philosophy explains the causal relation between the created beings
and the Giver of being based on necessary/contingent dualism. The world is the effect of
and dependent on the First Cause in almost the same way that the agent’s actions (as
accidents) depend on her as a substance. According to Ibn Sīnā, "nothing comes into
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existence unless its existence is necessitated."67 Mullā Ṣadrā is critical of this existential
gap and, by way of objection to his past masters, says that "they have argued for a second
being, trying to prove existence for the contingent next to the Being of the Real (al-

Ḥaqq)."68 For Mullā Ṣadrā,
The effect is not another thing next to its cause, and the mind cannot point
to the identity of the effect separately from the cause…the mind can,
however, think of the quiddity of the effect separately but we already know
that the real effect is being not quiddity. Now it is clear that the existence of
the effect, which is not complete in its identity, is only existent with regard
to its relation to the cause. Apart from the One Transcendent Reality, every
being is only a ray of the Light of His very Being…He is the Real and the rest
are His manifestations. He is the Light and the rest are the streaks of that
Light.69
Nevertheless, the relational (rabṭī) state of the created world does not imply its
illusoriness for Mullā Ṣadrā. Everything in the world including the immaterial and
material, substantial and accidental are relational in the sense that in their reality they
are only manifestations of the One who is Absolute (muṭlaq) and Independent (mustaqil).
Far from being illusions, the manifestations are different grades and intensities of the
same reality, i.e. being. "The doctrine of gradation not only supports the reality of
diversity, but also points out the all-encompassing simplicity of being qua being."70
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According to Mullā Ṣadrā, "the Simple Reality (al-basiṭ al-ḥaqīqa) is all things but none of
those things in particular." 71
This metaphysical paradox of diversity in unity is the background against which
Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion of prayer can be best understood. The above mentioned doctrine
of the existential dependence on the part of the beings in the world as relational, together
with the gradational reality of those beings form a conceptual framework within which
Mullā Ṣadrā tries to solve problems in areas where philosophy and theology overlap. One
of the most significant issues of this type is the nature of the God-world relationship. As
we have seen so far in this paper, the efficacy of prayer is related to the God-world
relationship and Mullā Ṣadrā’s answer to the problems that rise from attesting to this
efficacy is based on his view of the dynamics of that relationship.
As discussed in the paper, every action associated with a free agent, though
dependent on the will of God, also possesses a degree of reality just like every being is a
flash of the light of God. It is in this context that the Qur’anic verse (8:17) can be
interpreted not as the dismissal of human action, but as regarding human agency as a
degree of the Absolute agency of God.72 Along the same lines, the efficacy of prayer is
appreciated in its own right as a flame from the fire of the divine act. For Mullā Ṣadrā, to
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be existentially dependent on God would not contradict the reality of beings; nor would it
contradict the reality of our wills, wishes, and actions.
With the above in mind, I can now summarize Mullā Ṣadrā’s position on prayer in
terms of its dual effect on the inner and outer worlds: Prayer as the invocation of the
human soul to higher ranks of existence can be effective in the sense of diverting the
course of natural events to a particular direction desired by the soul. The will to change is
not wayward but inspired by the heavenly souls to the benefit of the world at large.
However, the relationship between the human and the heavenly souls is not a one-way
relation; nor can we interpret the heavenly inspiration as a mechanical inculcation of
ideas with the human soul having a merely instrumental role. Rather, the relationship is
mutual owing to the existential parallelism between the imaginative forms of the two
realms. This is made possible owing to the substantial evolution of the soul through
which the faculty of imagination gains the power to create imaginative forms that
correspond to the imaginal entities of the spiritual realm. The human soul also has the
power to cause changes in the material world. While the result of change in this case is to
be distinguished from the creation of imaginative forms by the imaginative faculty, the
process is similarly based on the existential correspondence between two grades of
being, that is, the sensible forms created by the faculty of sensation parallel to the
substantial forms which are bestowed on matter by the heavenly souls.
Thus, for Mullā Ṣadrā the creative power of the human soul is the key to the efficacy
of prayer. Like spirituality (rūḥāniyyat) itself, creativity is only potential in the beginning
and needs to be actualized once the soul reaches the high stages of her substantial
evolution. Naturally, only certain souls manage to reach such heights including prophets,
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Imams and awliyā as previously explained. On the other hand, the prayer is not only
efficacious when originating in great souls, but also it has the power to help the process of
existential advancement by increasing the average soul in humbleness and directing her
attention towards the spiritual domain above.

